Introduction
In modern economies, the health sector plays a central role in social policy, and the health policy responsibilities are correspondingly extensive. Politicians design the health insurance system, subsidize hospitals, regulate the pharmaceutical market, etc. So far only a few studies examined the political economy aspects of health policy. Scholars have, however, frequently analyzed the influence of political determinants on overall social expenditures (e.g., Iversen 2001 , Kittel and Obinger 2003 , Dreher 2006a , Potrafke 2009a . The empirical results suggest, among others, that leftist governments increased overall social spending till the end of the 1980s; but this partisan effect disappeared in the 1990s. Decomposing social expenditures and focusing on subcategories such as health expenditures in order to identify compensating effects thus emerges as a worthwhile endeavor. Schmidt (1999) concludes from an analysis of OECD countries that the influence of government ideology on health is weaker than in other fields of social policy because health is a particularly important and special good. The demographic change and rising inequality have, however, contributed to health policy becoming a more polarizing issue. In particular, the question of inter-and intragenerational redistribution has become significant in developed countries. As a consequence, the political parties need to adjust their platforms and policies, and self-interested incumbents may well consider whether to use the keen public interest in health policy to improve their re-election prospects by increasing health expenditures before elections.
Health care expenditures (HCE) have steadily risen in OECD countries and have therefore attracted a great deal of attention in the political discourse and in the scientific debate.
The cause of this increase in expenditures remains somewhat unclear (for surveys of the literature see Gerdtham and Jönsson 2000 and Okunade et al. 2004) . Three strands of the literature can be distinguished. The first strand identifies a positive correlation between HCE and GDP growth in OECD countries and shows that GDP explains a high percentage of the variation of HCE (e. g. Newhouse 1977 , Parkin et al. 1987 , Gerdtham and Jönsson 1991 , Gerdtham et al. 1992 , Hitiris and Posnett 1992 , also Leu 1986 , Culyer 1989 . The second strand refines the econometric techniques and tests for panel unit roots, cointegration and structural breaks etc. (e. g. Hansen and King 1996 , 1998 , McCoskey and Selden 1998 , Carrion-i-Silvestre 2005 , Jewell et al. 2003 , Narayan 2006 , Herwartz and Theilen 2003 . Introducing the third strand of literature, Gerdtham and Jönsson (2000) encourage testing for "new" explanatory variables. For example, Baumol's (1967) growth model of 'unbalanced growth' implies that HCE is driven by wage increases that exceed productivity growth (Hartwig 2008) . The relative price of medical care offers a ready explanation for the rise in HCE in OECD countries (Hartwig 2010) . The lion's share of total HCE is public, implying that political factors could also play an important role in explaining the steady increase in HCE.
In this paper, I empirically evaluate how political forces influence the growth of public HCE. The results suggest that incumbents behaved opportunistically and increased the growth of public health expenditures in election years. Government ideology did not have an influence.
These findings indicate (1) the importance of public health in policy debates before elections and (2) the political pressure towards re-organizing public health policy platforms especially in times of demographic change.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses the theoretical background (political business cycles, the partisan approach and the role of government in health policies) and derives the hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 presents the data and specifies the empirical model. Section 4 reports the regression results, investigates their robustness and discusses their implications. Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical background and hypotheses

Political business cycles, partisan approach and government types
The political business cycle approaches and the partisan theory explain how politicians influence macroeconomic outcomes. One implication of the political business cycle theories is that all incumbent politicians will implement the same expansionary economic policy before elections. In other words, political ideology retires to the background, and policies converge. The theories on political business cycles either assume adaptive (Nordhaus 1975) uninformed. The more voters (ex ante) fail to distinguish pre-electoral manipulations from incumbent competence, the more the incumbent profits from boosting expenditures before an election. Alt and Lassen (2006) point out that the higher the transparency of the political process, the lower the probability that politicians behave opportunistically.
The partisan approach, on the other hand, focuses on the influence of party ideology and shows to what extent leftwing and rightwing politicians will provide policies that reflect the preferences of their partisans. The leftist party appeals more to the labor base and promotes expansionary policies, whereas the rightwing party appeals more to capital owners, and is therefore more concerned with reducing inflation. This holds for both branches of the partisan theory -the classical approach (Hibbs 1977) 
The role of government in health policies
Theoretical political economy approaches to health policy have so far not addressed the influence of electoral motives and government ideology; they rather deal with the design of health insurance systems and their financing (see e.g., Breyer 1995 , Breyer and Haufler 2000 , Kifmann 2005 , Breyer et al. 2009 Figure 1 illustrates that, on average 5 , public HCE as a share of GDP increased from 3.6% in 1971 to 6.8% in 2004. The USA spent much less than the average for a long time, but they spent as much as the average in 2004. In Sweden, however, the share of public HCE on GDP was much higher than on average. In Australia and New Zealand, public HCE strongly increased in the early 1970s and were more volatile over the entire 1971-2004 period than on average. Figure 2 shows the shares of public expenditures on total HCE and stresses the meaning of public HCE: the share was about 70% on average. Sweden had a very high share between 80%
and 90%, while only 40% of the total HCE were public expenditures in the USA. The share of public expenditures in New Zealand was especially high in the 1980s. In Australia, the government always spent somewhat less for public HCE than on OECD average. In conclusion, the lion's share of HCE is public, which makes this measure an important indicator.
The empirical model
The dynamic panel data model has the following form:
where the dependent variable ∆log Public HCE it denotes the growth rate of public HCE (per capita, real terms). In the next paragraph I describe the political variables "Political Variable ijt "
and their coding in detail. Σ k β k ∆log X ikt contains the exogenous control variables. Since there is no consensus about which explanatory variables should be included, I select a relatively large number of explanatory variables in different regression specifications. I shall first consider public HCE as a share of social expenditures. I follow the related studies on social expenditures by including the growth rate of real GDP per capita (∆log GDP it ), the growth rate of the unemployment rate (∆log Unemployment it ), and the growth rate of the dependency ratio measured as the share of the citizens aged above 64 and below 14 (∆log Dependency Ratio it ).
Thus, the general economic situation, the situation of the labor market, and the demographic development are taken into account. In addition, further control variables can be considered to avoid potential omitted variable bias. For a long time, GDP was the only generally accepted explanatory variable for the rise of total HCE (per capita). Hartwig (2008) controlling for the effect of election years, the ideological party composition of the governments, the number of coalition partners and whether the respective governments had a majority in parliament (minority government).
The variable Election it takes the exact timing of the elections into account. Following
Franzese (2000), it is calculated as
where M is the month of the election, d is the day of the election and D is the number of days in that month. In all other years, its values are set to zero. Therefore, I directly control for fluctuations and the fact that the election dates differ between and in the individual countries (see also section 4.1).
An important challenge in testing for the influence of government ideology in an OECD panel is the heterogeneity of the parties and parliamentary systems in the various nation states.
The question is which governments should be labeled leftwing or rightwing -especially when there are more than two parties in government with different ideological roots. I employ the cannot reject the null hypothesis of the Hausman-Test that the difference in coefficients is not systematic. Hence, in this case, the random effects estimator (RE) is efficient and consistent (columns 1, 3, and 5). Columns (2), (4) and (6) refer to the model that includes a lagged dependent variable (DYN). Table 1 reports the coefficients and t-statistics (in absolute terms) for these six equations.
Results
Basic scenario: 1971 to 2004
The results in Table 1 illustrate that the inclusion of different sets of control variables does not affect the results referring to the political determinants. The control variables have the expected signs and their influence is robust across the different econometric specifications (columns 3 to 6). The positive elasticity of real per capita income on public HCE corroborates that governments increase public HCE when the economy is growing. The estimated coefficients imply that public HCE increased by about 0.4% when real per capita GDP increased by 1%. In contrast, the growth rates of the dependency ratio and the unemployment rate do not turn out to be statistically significant in columns (3) and (4). The regression results in columns (5) and (6) show that the growth rate of the unemployment rate is statistically significant at the 10% and 5%
level if the growth rate of the real compensation of employees is included in the regressions. The growth rate of the real compensation of employees enters the regressions with the expected positive sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level. period. The coefficients of the government ideology variable have the expected positive sign but do not turn out to be statistically significant. Moreover, the results suggest that coalition governments did not influence the growth of public HCE (the coefficient of the coalition type dummy 4 or more parties is statistically significant at the 10% level in column 5, however).
Minority governments also did not influence the growth of public HCE.
The electoral effects may depend on whether elections were part of the regular electoral cycle or whether they were irregular (early Therefore, I interpret the findings reported in Table 2 to strongly support the electoral cycle hypothesis.
Different policy periods: the 1970s and 1980s versus the 1990s
The Moreover, I include the interaction of the political variables and this "Post-Soviet" dummy in order to identify potential differences of the political determinants before and after the fall of the Iron Curtain. I normalize (mean zero, variance one) the political variables and "Post-Soviet" dummy before interacting. Including the "Post-Soviet" dummy variable requires excluding one of the temporal effect variables. Table 3 reports the regression results and indicates again that random effects are more appropriate than fixed country effects.
As can be seen from Table 3 , the coefficients of the election variable still have a positive sign and the government ideology variable still lacks statistical significance. The coefficients of the interaction terms between the government ideology variable and the "Post-Soviet" dummy been announced one year in advance. Then I would have to label them as regular. However, this would not affect my inferences.
have a negative sign but are statistically significant only at the 5% level in columns (3) and (5).
The government ideology variables and the interaction terms do not turn out to be statistically significant when the lagged dependent variable is included (columns 2, 4 and 6) as well as in column (1). The coefficients of the interaction terms between the coalition type (4 or more parties) variable and the "Post-Soviet" dummy have a negative sign and are statistically significant at the 5% level in columns (1) and (3) and at the 10% level in columns (4) and (5). The marginal effects of the political variables have to be interpreted conditionally on the interaction with the "Post-Soviet" dummy (see Friedrich 1982) . In principle, there are two sensible ways to evaluate the marginal effects. I follow Dreher and Gassebner (2007), evaluating the marginal effects at the minimum as well as the maximum of the interacted variable, i.e., the "Post-Soviet" dummy (Table 4) . Using this method one can distinguish between the impacts of the political variables on the growth of public HCE before and after communism collapsed. If one chooses to evaluate the marginal effects at the average level of the "Post-Soviet" dummy, the statistical significance of these average effects corresponds to the respective t-statistics of the political variables in Table 3 .
The results in Table 4 however, that the analysis does not take into account that party ideologies may have changed.
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Overall, the results seem to be in accordance with the claim that health is a special good in the sense that government ideology hardly matters in providing public health care.
Further robustness tests and discussion
The results derived from the different model specifications indicate that the reported political effects are robust, i.e. they are not sensitive to the inclusion/exclusion of particular explanatory variables. In line with the related literature, the dependency ratio did not turn out to be significant. 12 In further specifications (not shown), I use the share of the population aged 65
and above (old age population) and the share of the population aged 15 and below instead of the dependency ratio (Shelton 2007). Both variables have a negative influence on public HCE, but do not change the political effects at all. Alternatively, I include the old age population in thousands, not as a share. This specification does not change the inferences regarding the political variables.
I also replace the KOF index of globalization by trade-openness. Trade-openness does not turn out to be statistically significant and the political effects remain unchanged. Using the economic, 11 Potrafke (2009b) developed a dynamic index of voter polarization and uses German data to illustrate the concept. If it were possible to construct such a dynamic index for all OECD countries, one could evaluate in more depth whether the growth of public HCE was not induced by government ideology. 12 The demographic change just started in the considered 1971-2004 period. Hence the regression result does not necessarily imply that the increasing share of older people does not give rise to higher public HCE.
social and political KOF sub indices of globalization instead of the overall index does not change the conclusions either.
To control for contemporaneous correlation across the countries I applied panel corrected standard errors according to Beck and Katz (1995, 1996) . Results do not change at all when panel corrected standard errors are applied.
The reported effects could depend on idiosyncratic circumstances in individual countries.
I therefore test whether the results are sensitive to the inclusion/exclusion of particular countries.
This kind of sensitivity analysis also highlights the historical background and hence provides Thatcher government by about 35% in real terms, higher than the total increase in GDP (Boix 1998: 192-194) . After overall public spending had increased in the course of the recession at the beginning of the 1980s, these rightwing governments in the UK and USA eventually curbed social transfers and cut public spending on capital formation and industrial subsidies. However, spending for social affairs was not reduced. "Strict electoral calculations partially explain the Conservatives' conscious rejection of any substantial reduction in core welfare programs to achieve their overall goal of lower public expenditure. Popular support for the welfare state was just too strong" (Boix 1998: 192) .
Conclusion
Incumbents The demographic change will have a distinct influence on health policies in the future.
Political economic models have not really dealt with this novel phenomenon so far. A more encompassing theory is required to portray how electoral motives and government ideology influence public health policy in the course of demographic change. In most OECD countries, the number of pensioners and thus of people who receive benefits from the public health system increases while the number of younger citizens who pay contributions to the public health systems decreases. Leftwing and rightwing parties need to adjust their policy platforms to the demographic change, and the public health systems in OECD countries need to be reformed to remain sustainable. A prime question will be, whether leftwing and rightwing political parties will offer different policy platforms on redistribution and deductibles in the public health system.
Health care reforms, however, require majorities in the electorate. Pensioners and people who receive benefits from the public health system are not likely to vote for reforms that decrease their own benefits (although the old generation cannot extort the young generation boundlessly, see Breyer and Stolte 2001 on the feasibility of pension reform). A second and yet open question is whether pensioners and benefit recipients would be willing to forgo benefits in favor of keeping public health systems financially affordable.
Public health has been an important topic in the public debate and in election campaigns.
In the 2008 US election campaign, for example, a significant aspect of Barack Obama's platform was to propose a compulsory health insurance system. In the first one and a half years after his election, Obama has however not had sufficient support in his own democratic party to introduce a compulsory health insurance system. In Germany, reforms of the public health system were intensively debated before the federal elections in 2005 and 2009. These examples nicely illustrate my findings:
(1) the importance of public health in policy debates before elections and (2) the political pressure towards re-organizing public health policy platforms.
Appendix: panel unit root tests
In order to test for stationarity of the time series, I apply a battery of panel unit root tests.
The log(public HCE) = log of public HCE per capita, log(GDP) = log of GDP per capita, log(unemployment) = log of unemployment rate log(dependency_ratio) = log of the dependency ratio, log(comp_employees) = log of compensation of employees, log(private HCE) = log of private HCE per capita log(population) = log of (total) population, log(IOG) = log of the KOF index of globalization Tables 5-7 report the results of different unit root tests and demonstrate that we can always reject the null hypotheses of a unit root in growth rates except for the dependency ratio. Overall, I
conclude from these tests that the panel data in growth rates are stationary. ); * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The regressions in columns (1), (3) and (5) are estimated with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) Newey-West type standard errors. ); * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The regressions in columns (1), (3) and (5) are estimated with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) Newey-West type standard errors. (absolute values) ; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The regressions in columns (1), (3) and (5) are estimated with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) Newey-West type standard errors. Dreher, 2006a) . The overall index covers the economic, social and political dimensions of globalization. It defines globalization to be the process of creating networks of connections among actors at multi-continental distances, mediated through a variety of flows including people, information and ideas, capital and goods. Globalization is conceptualized as a process that erodes national boundaries, integrates national economies, cultures, technologies and governance and produces complex relations of mutual interdependence. More specifically, the three dimensions of the KOF index are defined as: ♦ economic globalization, characterized as long distance flows of goods, capital and services as well as information and perceptions that accompany market exchanges; ♦ political globalization, characterized by a diffusion of government policies; and ♦ social globalization, expressed as the spread of ideas, information, images and people.
Dreher (2006b), Dreher et al. (2008b) 
